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Abstract 
Antony Duff argues that the criminal law’s characteristic function is to hold people responsible. 
It only has the authority to do this when the person who is called to account, and those who call 
her to account, share some prior relationship. In systems of domestic criminal law, this 
relationship is co-citizenship. The polity is the relevant community. In international criminal law, 
the relevant community is simply the moral community of humanity. I am sympathetic to his 
community-based analysis, but argue that the moral community must play a greater role in the 
domestic case and that the collection of individual political communities must play a greater role 
in the international case. 
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Antony Duff provides a sophisticated account of domestic
1
 and international criminal law that 
binds together responsibility and authority.
2
 He argues that a key function of the criminal law is 
to hold people responsible for their actions, and that trials are a form of dialogue in which the 
polity expresses its values and the alleged perpetrator must give an account of his conduct. This 
function of the criminal law is more crucial than deterrence or giving offenders the punishment 
they deserve. Duff argues that carrying out this function always raises the question of who has 
the authority to hold alleged wrongdoers responsible. Responsibility and authority are 
inseparable. The criminal law possesses authority only when the person held responsible, and 
those calling him to account, are all members of a community. In his analysis of the domestic 
criminal law he concludes that the relevant parties must all be citizens of the same polity. In the 
international criminal law, the relevant community is the moral community of humanity.  
In Section 2, I will present Duff’s theory of responsibility and authority in the criminal law. In 
Section 3, I argue that we should combine Duff’s view with P.F. Strawson’s reactive attitudes 
account of responsibility.
3
 In Section 3, I criticize Duff’s understanding of the role of citizenship 
(in domestic criminal law) and humanity (in the international criminal law). His argument for the 
importance of citizenship in the domestic law is that the most compelling alternative, appealing 
to the moral community, is unsatisfying in the way that any cosmopolitan theory that does not 
properly value local attachments is unsatisfying. I will argue that this conclusion is reached only 
via a false dichotomy. The moral community is relevant in both the domestic and international 
cases, but this does not mean we cannot account for the value of local attachments within our 
                                                          
1
 Antony Duff, ‘Responsibility, Citizenship, and Criminal Law’, in RA Duff and Stuart P Green, 
 (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) pp. 
125-148. 
2
 Antony Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in Samantha Besson and 
 John Tasioulas, (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University Press, New York,  
 2010) pp. 589-604. 
3
 Peter F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, and Other Essays (Methuen, New York, 1962). 
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polities. The moral community must play a greater role in the domestic case, and the 
international case must rely on more than merely the community of moral agents. 
 
 
 
2. Duff’s Account of Responsibility and Authority  
 
Responsibility plays two roles in Duff’s analysis of the criminal law. The first is that the 
essential function of criminal law is to hold people responsible. This is responsibility in the sense 
of it being warranted to call someone to account, to demand that they give a response when 
challenged regarding the wrong they have allegedly done. Scanlon calls this attributive 
responsibility.
4
 Person P is attributively responsible for some state of affairs in virtue of what it 
is that they have done. The trial holds them to account for some state of affairs, and the onus is 
on the alleged perpetrator to respond, either by denying that he is attributively responsible for the 
state of affairs, or by admitting he is attributively responsible but there is an excuse, or by 
admitting he is attributively responsible and that he is guilty of doing wrong. 
This raises the question of who has the authority to hold alleged wrongdoers to account. 
Person P is responsible for some state of affairs to some person, community, or institution. With 
the party that holds others to account we find an implicit appeal to a second form of 
responsibility, what Scanlon calls substantive responsibility. These are the obligations attached 
to certain identities or roles. For example, a teacher has a responsibility to teach and care for his 
students. When Duff discusses authority, he focuses on the question of who has the right to call 
                                                          
4
 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Belknap Press, Cambridge, 1998). 
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the alleged wrongdoer to account. But he sometimes goes beyond this to suggest that a party may 
have not only the right but also the obligation to hold the alleged wrongdoer to account. We owe 
it to the victims to show that we take their wrongs seriously. To do this we must “share in the 
wrong” with the victim and call the perpetrator to account.5 We even owe it to perpetrators to 
call them to account, because that is to treat them as responsible agents. 
Duff attempts to define the ‘we’ that has the right, and sometimes the obligation, to do this. 
The criminal law comprises the institutions and procedures through which we hold perpetrators 
responsible for their wrongs. “Such a practice of calling to account is possible, however, only 
within a normative community to which both called and callers can be said to belong.”6 He 
argues that the domestic case is the “salient paradigm” for criminal law.7 Therefore, we should 
start with the domestic case and then extend or adapt it to account for international criminal law.  
We need to identify the relevant community, which will in turn specify the set of public 
wrongs via its self-defining values. A system of domestic criminal law is not a set of prohibitions 
that makes conduct wrong. Rather, the criminal law determines “which precriminal wrongs 
should count as ‘public’ wrongs whose perpetrators are to be called to public account”.8 ‘Public’ 
means neither that the offense is carried out in public, nor that the public is directly harmed (as 
might be the case with harm to the environment). “To call a wrong public in this sense is not to 
give a reason for the public to take an interest in it, but to express the judgment that it is their 
business.”9 When a wrong is the public’s business, they may call alleged wrongdoers to account. 
                                                          
5
 Duff, supra note 2, p.595. 
6
 Duff, supra note 1, p.126. 
7
 Duff, supra note 1, p. 126. 
8
 Ibid., p. 127. 
9
 Ibid., p. 128. 
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This can only be legitimate in virtue of some prior relationship that gives A the right or standing 
to call B to account, and that makes A’s alleged wrongdoing B’s business.10 
 In virtue of community membership, they must share a relationship that is substantive enough 
to authorize the practice of holding to account. This makes the wrong committed by one the 
proper concern of the other. Without that, B has no authority to call A to account because the 
wrong is not his proper concern. Duff argues that this authority cannot be simply created by the 
institutions or practices of criminal law. It must derive from some prior community relationship. 
What community could ground this authority? One candidate is the community of moral agents. 
Duff’s own arguments might push one towards this answer. If public wrongs must be moral 
wrongs, that is, conduct that was wrong prior to any particular criminal law’s existence, why not 
appeal to the moral community of humanity? We are each capable of being responsible for our 
conduct, and we collectively have the authority to call each other to account for wrongs.  
Duff rejects this answer for being unable to justify certain features of the actual (and ideal) 
legal landscape. For example, crimes committed by Polish citizens in Poland are not prosecuted 
by courts in England. If the authority to hold people responsible for their wrongs is generated by 
the moral community, then what justification can we give for this phenomenon? Duff argues that 
this approach can only justify the Territorial Principle (a system of criminal law claims sole 
authority over wrongs committed within the state) in terms of efficiency. It recognizes no 
intrinsic value in a polity holding its own citizens to account for their public wrongs. This 
practice is only justified if it serves the function of the criminal law more efficiently than a 
genuinely international alternative, due to lower costs, easier access to information, cultural 
considerations, and so on.  
                                                          
10
 Ibid., p. 132. 
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Duff objects that this is an unsatisfying justification of the Territorial Principle. He draws an 
analogy between this case and what he finds unsatisfying about all impersonal, universalized 
moral theories. Such theories either cannot make sense of local attachments or ascribe to them 
the wrong sort of value. He clearly thinks this understanding of the community that underwrites 
the criminal law is analogous to, or entails, a cosmopolitan ethical view that does not recognize 
intrinsic value in local attachments. The citizenship relation has a special form of value that 
cannot be reduced to merely pragmatic considerations. Duff provides a series of examples that 
are supposed to convince the reader that local attachments matter. It was unsatisfying to try 
Augusto Pinochet outside Chile. It was important and valuable that Saddam Hussein was tried in 
Iraq. A victim of a serious attack would be unsatisfied were his attacker to be convicted in a 
foreign court.
11
 These local, particular, attached moral sentiments must find expression in the 
community that gives authority to the criminal law. Therefore the ‘we’ who hold alleged 
wrongdoers to account must be narrower than the entire moral community. It should be the 
citizens of a polity. Making the community the polity serves two important functions. First, it 
gives the standing required to authoritatively hold people responsible. Second, it provides a way 
to pick out, from the set of moral wrongs, the subset of public wrongs. It accomplishes both of 
these functions through the polity’s self-defining values. 
 “Public wrongs are our wrongs as citizens---wrongs in which we take a proper interest, to 
which we should collectively respond, for which we claim the right (and perhaps the duty) to call 
the perpetrator to answer to us.”12 Some of these wrongs are materially public, in the sense that 
the entire public is harmed. But that is not necessary. Most public wrongs are done to 
individuals, yet these are public wrongs because they violate our public values. We share the 
                                                          
11
 Ibid, p. 136. 
12
 Ibid, p. 139. 
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wrong with the victim. Our concern for the victim as a fellow citizen makes the wrong our 
business, as does our recognition of the wrongdoer as a fellow citizen. A wrong done by one of 
us, when it violates our shared public values, is our business, and therefore we may (and perhaps 
ought to) hold its perpetrator responsible.
13
 
Duff argues that making the polity the relevant community will specify a set of public 
wrongs, because “however minimal the public sphere of matters that concern all citizens is taken 
to be, any polity must have a public sphere, structured by its self-defining values”.14 Thus the 
authority of the criminal law is grounded in something that is historically and conceptually prior: 
the co-citizen relationship among the polity’s people. The polity’s self-defining values then 
determine the set of public wrongs. Wrongs that violate those public values are public wrongs. 
This does not mean conduct that counts as a public wrong in one polity is not wrongful when 
committed in another. It can also be wrongful elsewhere, but is not our proper concern. “What is 
at issue here, however, is what concerns us as citizens, and what concerns the criminal law of 
this particular polity; we cannot see a rape committed in Poland as a wrong committed within our 
civic enterprise as a polity or, therefore, as a wrong that concerns our criminal law.”15 The polity, 
its self-defining values, and the citizenship relationship among its members jointly determine the 
set of public wrongs and generate the authority required to hold people responsible for their 
wrongs. 
2.1 Extension to the International Criminal Law 
 
Duff treats the international criminal law as having the same essential function as in the 
domestic case: calling people to account and holding them responsible. The international 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid. 
15
 Ibid., p. 140. 
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criminal law begins “with the (collectively) personal thought ‘we ought to call them to account’: 
this will show why trials are so important; it will also, when we ask who ‘we’ are, highlight the 
issue of what gives international courts the authority that they claim”.16 Who is this ‘we’ is and 
how can it possess the authority to try alleged wrongdoers under international criminal law? 
There are two types of phenomena to explain. How can a particular polity ever authoritatively 
claim universal jurisdiction? For example, English law claims jurisdiction over any state official 
in the world who uses torture in furtherance of his official duties. Second, how can international 
tribunals and the International Criminal Court claim universal jurisdiction? There is no problem 
explaining how these bodies can gain authority that is delegated to them by particular states. But 
the ICC also claims universal jurisdiction when alleged crimes are referred to it by the UN 
Security Council. How could it have the legitimate authority to do so? “An answer must show 
that the court acts in the name of some group to whom the defendant is answerable for his 
alleged crimes.”17 
Duff considers two answers to this problem. This first is that wrongdoers are answerable to 
the political community against which they committed their crimes, and the ICC acts on behalf 
of that community. This coheres with the previous examples indicating there is more than merely 
instrumental value in trying the defendant in the state where he committed his crimes. Two 
phenomena generate space for the international criminal law to serve a necessary function. Some 
crimes are genuinely international, such as crimes of state aggression. In this case the aggressor 
and the victim are not united by citizenship, and thus an international form of criminal law is 
required to call the wrongdoer to account. The second type of case occurs when a domestic legal 
system fails to act on behalf of some constituent community, which may either be citizens, or a 
                                                          
16
 Duff, supra note 2, p. 593. 
17
 Ibid., p. 598. 
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group the state should (but does not) recognize as citizens. When that occurs, an international 
court has the authority to intervene. It would be foolish to leave such matters up to the states in 
question. They might be unlikely to prosecute an official who uses torture in an official capacity, 
or to provide any adequate response to wrongs committed against a subjugated minority. So 
while it is ideal that a wrongdoer answers directly to his particular political community, this may 
not be possible. When the “crimes are serious enough to warrant the costs involved, it might be 
appropriate for an international court to claim jurisdiction or, absent such a court, for courts of 
other states to claim jurisdiction on behalf of the citizens whose own courts have let them 
down”.18 Thus national courts are left alone except when they fail to meet the minimum standard 
of fulfilling their obligations or in cases where the wrongs are genuinely international. Then an 
international body intervenes, but the essential structure of the criminal law does not change, 
because that court still acts on behalf of the relevant polity. 
Duff rejects this account for two reasons. The first is that with the most egregious crimes 
against humanity, when the case for international intervention seems strongest, there might be 
doubt whether there exists a political community to which the perpetrator could answer. Suppose 
the target of the crimes is completely wiped out. This would leave no community to play the 
necessary role. The even more pressing matter is that we still have not explained how the ICC 
could have the unconditional right to act in the name of a political community. How could an 
international court have a legitimate but non-delegated authority?  
This leads Duff to answer that the ICC acts on behalf of humanity. “[W]hat gives it the right 
to intervene on behalf of members of more local polities whose national courts have let them 
down is our shared humanity; but that is not far from saying that the perpetrators should have to 
                                                          
18
 Ibid., p. 599. 
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answer not merely to their polity, but to humanity.”19 This answer makes the international case 
fundamentally different from the domestic case, because humanity is not a political community. 
Should we take this as evidence that the international criminal law does not have full authority 
until there is a global political community, or as evidence that when we extend our domestic 
analysis to the international realm, we must make some deep changes? One option is to argue 
that a global political community should be our aspiration, and only when humanity forms a 
political community will the international criminal law have unimpeachable authority. That is 
not Duff’s position. He argues instead that we need only understand humanity as a moral 
community.  
As in the domestic case, Duff denies that the public wrongs of international criminal law must 
harm the global moral community. One might argue that being so harmed gives humanity the 
standing to call alleged perpetrators to account. On the contrary, the reason we condemn and 
punish a wrongdoer is for the wrong he did to his specific victim(s). International public wrongs 
are not public because they harm humanity, but because they properly concern all members of 
humanity. “[T]hey are wrongs that we share in virtue of our membership of that community. A 
crime against humanity should be one that properly concerns us all, in virtue simply of our 
shared humanity.”20 
In the international case, authority is grounded in our shared membership in the moral 
community of humanity. This still leaves us with the task of specifying which particular wrongs 
are international public wrongs. Duff admits that must more work needs to be done on this issue. 
He does not provide a complete answer. (Neither will I.) He cites the Rome Statute’s discussion 
                                                          
19
 Ibid., p. 600. 
20
 Ibid., p. 600. 
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of “unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity”.21 The implication 
seems to be that moral egregiousness is the key to filling out this summation of his view: “some 
kinds of wrong should concern us, are properly our business, in virtue of our shared humanity 
with their victims (and perpetrators): for such wrongs the perpetrators must answer not just to 
their local communities, but to humanity”.22 
I will now provide a critical analysis of Duff’s account of the relationship between 
responsibility and authority. In Section 3 I argue that P.F. Strawson’s reactive-attitudes account 
of responsibility can both fill a gap in Duff’s theory and further explain the moral psychology 
behind the international criminal law. In Section 4 I criticize Duff’s view that the authority of the 
international law is generated by the moral community of humanity and provide an alternative 
explanation. 
 
 
3. Where is Responsibility? 
 
Duff does not provide any full theory of responsibility. However, it is clear that he favors a 
reasons-responsiveness view.
23
 This grounds responsibility in a capacity to recognize reasons 
and to act or refrain from acting on the basis of reasons. Such an approach is more concerned 
with the link between reasons and actions than with any metaphysical conception of free will. 
Duff also thinks that responsibility in the sense relevant to criminal law is always relational and 
practice based. By relational, he means it is always a matter of some subject being responsible 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., p. 601. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Antony Duff, ‘Who is Responsible, for What, to Whom?’, 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2005) 441-
461.  
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for some object, and responsible to some body. It is practice based because to be responsible is 
to be liable to be held to responsible by someone within some particular institution or practice. 
Within the practices relevant to criminal law, “we take it for granted that most adult human 
beings are responsible subjects”.24 He instead focuses on the separation between cases in which 
we take it for granted that a subject is responsible and the conditions that prevent someone from 
being capable of being responsible. That distinction has to do with the possession of the 
capacities required for proper responsiveness to reasons. Hence the very young, and some of the 
mentally impaired, are not responsible in virtue of lacking the necessary capacities. If they are 
not properly responsive to reasons, they cannot be responsible because “[w]e are responsible 
(prospectively and retrospectively) for what we have reason to do or not to do”.25 The criminal 
law’s task is to give authoritative recognition to the prior moral reasons to refrain from doing 
wrongs that violate the polity’s public values. This authoritative recognition certifies these as 
public wrongs. Without the relevant capacities required to engage with these reasons, a subject 
cannot participate in the criminal law.  
Philosophers may object that this work on responsibility and authority must engage with 
worries about determinism and free will. I will briefly outline a strategy for responding to that 
objection. Duff mentions that it might be added to his discussion of responsibility that 
determinism’s truth or falsity is irrelevant to the practices under consideration, and cites P.F. 
Strawson’s work as an example of this approach. Strawson’s conception of responsibility not 
only can help Duff answer this objection, it explains the impulse to hold people to account for 
their wrongs.  
                                                          
24
 Ibid., p. 444. 
25
 Ibid., p. 445. 
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Strawson understands responsibility in terms of a set of interpersonal reactive attitudes or 
emotional states. Being a proper object of these states is what it is to be a responsible agent. For 
example, if you intentionally harm me, I naturally and justifiably feel resentment towards your ill 
will. It is constitutive of these natural reactive attitudes that we have a general expectation of 
good will among people. We expect that persons will not attempt to harm one another, and that 
they will show concern for each other’s well being. When a wrong is done, certain attitudes or 
responses are appropriate. The harmed party feels resentment. The offender should feel guilt. A 
third party observer may feel indignation. 
However, if you merely accidentally harm me, rather than wrong me, then you are not a 
proper object of my resentment. If I am in error about the stance behind your action, and 
conclude that you have shown disregard for my well-being, I may wrongly feel resentment. But 
an explanation (you kicked me because you had a mild seizure) can modify my attitudes. I can 
then switch from taking the reactive stance towards you to the objective stance. The latter is what 
we properly take when conduct is involuntary, or in Duff’s terms, the subject lacks certain 
capacities that are required to be responsible. We can only properly take the objective stance 
towards a normal adult human for discrete moments, not universally. Some mentally disabled 
persons, however, may never be the proper object of the reactive attitudes. If we think lack of the 
relevant capacities matters, we must think that in normal cases, persons are capable of being 
responsible.  
Strawson agrees with Duff’s claim that we take responsibility for granted. “Our natural 
disposition to such attitudes and judgments is naturally secured against arguments suggesting 
they are in principle unwarranted or unjustified."
26
 They are secured against any argument that 
they are globally unjustified, and therefore insulated from the truth or falsity of determinism. The 
                                                          
26
 Strawson, supra note 3, p. 32. 
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first reason Strawson gives for this position is that if the truth or falsity of determinism could 
threaten the practices involved in responsibility, then we would be obligated to give up these 
practices, and we simply cannot do that. We cannot completely refrain from feeling the reactive 
attitudes towards each other, nor from praising and blaming, punishing and rewarding. This 
inability can be understood as something definitive of humanity. This argument is descriptive, 
based in a speculative but plausible thesis about human psychology and social practice. Duff 
admitted that much more needs to be said about humanity and crimes against humanity, and this 
argument fleshes out a feature of humanity that is tied to responsibility: we cannot universally 
take the objective stance towards each other. That gives us a reason to hold each other to 
account.  
Strawson’s second argument for his thesis is that, even if we could abandon the reactive 
attitudes in response to whatever metaphysical conclusion gives us anxiety, we ought not do so. 
This is a normative claim about what form of human life has value. We should opt for the world 
in which we normally take the reactive stance towards each other. This is also a reason to hold 
each other responsible, because doing so is constitutive of a valuable form of life. So in the first 
argument Strawson relies on a description of what humanity is, and in the second argument he 
relies on a view about what humanity should be. As long as one of these arguments is sound, we 
have a justification for Duff’s strategy of analyzing responsibility and authority without worrying 
about debates over causal determinism, and we also have a further specification of the 
community of humanity that underwrites the authority of international criminal law.  
Now, one may object that in order for the criminal law to justifiably hold someone 
responsible, they must be responsible in some metaphysical sense that is incompatible with 
determinism and that Strawson’s account does not provide. On this line of thought, Duff and 
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Strawson fail to insulate responsibility from worries about determinism. In order to be genuinely 
responsible one needs a form of contra-causal freedom. (For sophisticated examples of such 
views, see the work of Robert Kane and Timothy O’Connor.) According to this objection, 
neither Strawson’s descriptive nor normative arguments falsify the claim that determinism and 
genuine responsibility are incompatible.  
I disagree with this objection and think Duff’s appeal to reasons-responsiveness is the right 
strategy. Since we do in fact deem it morally and legally relevant whether or not persons are 
incapacitated in their ability to respond to reasons, we do take it for granted that persons with 
normal capacities are capable of being responsible. Similarly, Strawson thinks that being a 
proper object of the reactive attitudes just is definitive of responsibility. I have presented 
Strawson’s work as a way to justify and fill out Duff’s claim that we take responsibility for 
granted. I will now bracket and move on from the lively and ongoing dispute over free will and 
determinism. 
Strawson’s work, when combined with Duff’s, also helps explain the moral psychology 
behind international criminal law. We should feel negative reactive attitudes about our polities 
and ourselves when we know there is a state in which public international wrongs go 
unanswered, or crimes of aggression go unanswered, and we could do something to hold the 
wrongdoer responsible. We should feel indignation towards the wrongdoers. If we do nothing, 
we should feel guilt about our ill will. If the entire globe were covered in domestic states that did 
an adequate job responding to public wrongs, there would be no reason to feel these negative 
attitudes towards ourselves. But when one state breaks down or turns malevolent, then showing 
good will towards our fellow members of humanity, whom we take it for granted are responsible 
agents, requires holding wrongdoers to account.  
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4. Authority and Community: An Objection and Modification 
 
As in the domestic criminal law, Duff grounds the authority of the international criminal law 
in a community. In this domain, he defines the relevant community as humanity. Humanity is 
not, he grants, a political community. It is merely a moral community. This is quite unlike the 
domestic case. My objection is that the domestic and international analyses are an unstable 
mixture. First, if a political community is not always necessary for the authority of criminal law, 
where does this leave the arguments he gave in the domestic case? Second, if the international 
criminal law does not involve a political community and its self-defining values, how do we 
determine the set of public wrongs in the international case? In the domestic case public wrongs 
are determined by the self-defining values of the polity. What, if anything, can fulfill this 
function in the international criminal law? 
The analysis Duff gives of the international law as grounded in the moral community is 
explicitly considered and rejected in his analysis of the domestic law. Appeal to the moral 
community is rejected as too universalist and impartial, and therefore unable to explain the value 
of local, particular attachments. Recall the examples of why a dictator should be tried by his own 
people, why someone who is wronged would be unsatisfied if his attacker were convicted by a 
foreign court, and so on. Duff takes these particular attachments to have a form of value that is 
destroyed by a universalist understanding of the criminal law. Thus when he demands there be a 
community that binds the one called to account and those doing the calling, he denies that this 
can simply be the entire moral community. It must be something narrower. It must be a political 
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community, and there must be a compatriot relationship between the parties. However, in the 
international case, the community is merely humanity, which is to say, the moral community. 
Therefore criminal law can rely upon a universal community, and this community need not even 
be a political community. Why could we not give the same analysis of the criminal law in all its 
forms?  
I see three options for interpreting the relationship between Duff’s domestic and international 
theories. The first would be to deny the importance of the particular attachments that Duff 
emphasizes, admit that they can only be pragmatically justified, and grant that we must be open 
to radically revising or eliminating them. This would give a unified account of domestic and 
criminal law. The second option is to follow Duff and argue that the domestic case must account 
for phenomena that are absent in the international sphere. Therefore we cannot simply extend our 
analysis from the paradigm domestic case to the international case, we must allow for some 
major changes to the theory. The third is a middle option Duff does not consider. Even though 
particular attachments are valuable and have a role to play, the moral community plays a role in 
generating the authority of even domestic criminal law. Similarly, political communities generate 
the authority of international criminal law. They do not do this by any strict democratic 
procedures, but via a set of political ideals and values. 
Duff rejects an explanation of domestic criminal law by appeal to the moral community 
because he believes that this move entails cosmopolitanism. Since he thinks that local 
attachments and have genuine value, and that cosmopolitanism cannot give an adequate 
justification of that value, he rejects the moral community option in the domestic case. What 
drives this argument is Duff’s commitment that those local phenomena and practices ought not to 
be radically revised or forsaken. He concludes that the only way to let them retain their value is 
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to narrow the relevant community. To generate authority, the community must be local and 
political. Therefore the relationship relevant to the analysis of responsibility and authority in the 
criminal law is citizenship. The rejection of cosmopolitanism is the crucial move in Duff’s 
domestic analysis, and it is the only reason for treating domestic and international law 
differently.  
What if the moral community is relevant to all forms of criminal law, yet there is still sui 
generis value to citizenship status and particular attachments? A third option is open: we appeal 
to the moral community without committing ourselves to the cosmopolitanism that Duff rejects. 
Note that one of the universal goods of human life is participating in a polity, shaping and 
affirming its self-defining values. Appealing to the moral community only entails 
cosmopolitanism if we have reason to believe there should be a total convergence on those 
values and therefore on what counts as a public wrong. My suggestion is that we can link Duff’s 
discussion of the self-defining values of particular polities to a universal human good. We must 
come together in political communities to construct and express these self-defining values. 
According to this third option, the difference between the domestic and international is not that 
we move from a more specific to a more universal community, but rather, that we move from a 
domain in which there can be reasonable disagreement over what counts as a public wrong to a 
domain in which the criminal law deals solely with consensus among reasonable polities on what 
qualifies as a public wrong. That consensus should be based in reasons that can speak to all the 
world’s people, and not require adherence to any particular comprehensive religious or 
philosophical conception of the good.
27
 International criminal law should deal only with what is 
beyond the scope of reasonable disagreement. There can be reasonable disagreement over 
                                                          
27
 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1993). 
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private, though morally egregious, wrongs. It is political consensus, not comprehensive moral 
egregiousness, that determines the relevant international wrongs.  
The structural similarity between this move and Richard Miller’s work in distributive justice 
is illuminating.
28
 He denies the apparent tension between universalist moral requirements and 
giving redistributive priority to one’s worst-off compatriots. He argues that patriotic bias in 
redistribution is justified, not a violation of a universal ethical duty of equal concern for all 
persons. He therefore denies that there is a contradiction between patriotic bias and universal 
ethical requirements. There are crucial goods that all humans need, but that, for the majority of 
humanity, can only be realized in local communities. These are goods of self-respect and 
respectful social interaction. While some small number of privileged elites can obtain these 
goods in a way that transcends nationality, the overwhelming majority of humanity must secure 
them through interaction with their fellow citizens. Miller’s point is that domestic bias in 
redistribution is not an exception to universal ethical requirements, it is universally required. To 
realize our good as social beings we must live in a polity, and that polity, if it has serious 
inequality, can only generate those goods when it prioritizes internal over external redistribution. 
In states with significant inequality, lack of patriotic bias generates resentment and a loss of 
social trust, and therefore prevents citizens from securing those universal goods. Miller’s 
argument on this point nicely dovetails with Duff’s, since lack of patriotic bias in such polities 
not only undermines faith in the public political culture and inhibits participation in democratic 
political processes, it also undermines people’s motivation to obey and respect the law. 
My third option exhibits this same structure. We must create polities with self-defining 
values. This is because, as Miller argues, it is necessary for securing the universal good of 
                                                          
28
 Richard W. Miller, ‘Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern’, 27(3) Philosophy and Public Affairs (1998) 
202-224. 
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respectful social interaction. But beyond that, we need to take some particular stand on what 
wrongs should be considered public wrongs for which we will collectively hold people 
responsible. This is universalist, but acknowledges the value of local attachments because 
variation among the values of different polities is neither a temporary nor lamentable feature of 
human social life. (Rawls makes the same point about internal disagreement within a free state.) 
Free people will never converge on a single comprehensive conception of the good, or even on a 
compatible set of conceptions. Such consensus only arises through subjugation. There is not a set 
of objective public values on which we will reach complete consensus, therefore we will not 
reach total consensus on what qualifies as a public wrong. Duff admits there is reasonable 
disagreement among polities over what counts as a public wrong. This is explicit in his 
discussion of how non-citizens who are guests in a state are still subject to its domestic law, even 
when it differs from their native laws. What counts as a public wrong varies in accordance with 
the defining values of different polities.  
This third option makes the moral community relevant to international criminal law, but it 
also makes each particular polity relevant to international law. This fills a lacuna in Duff’s 
account. He ties public wrongs in the domestic case to the particular political community’s self-
defining values, but there is no analogous political community with self-defining values in the 
international case. This is why he implicitly resorts to the idea that egregious wrongs and 
atrocities constitute the relevant international public wrongs. But this leaves us with some 
uncomfortable results. As discussed earlier, Duff claims that when we think about what concerns 
us as citizens, we cannot see a rape committed in Poland as something that concerns us and our 
criminal law. But if the moral community is relevant to the domestic criminal law, then we can 
say that rapes committed in other states can concern us as citizens. It potentially concerns us 
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because no reasonable set of self-defining values can be compatible with rape. Therefore if it 
occurs in a state that does not consider it to be a violation of its values, or in a failed state, it does 
concern us as citizens. That is because showing good will to the residents of that territory 
requires allowing them to secure the universal human good of living in a polity with a reasonable 
set of defining values and with a minimally effective system for holding wrongdoers responsible. 
That is our concern as citizens because any attempt to hold those wrongdoers responsible must 
be effected through the political power of our states. We cannot accomplish this individually. If 
our state has the ability to contribute to holding these people responsible, but does not, then we 
can justifiably feel guilty about ourselves and resentful of our polity. This is one way to 
understand the obligation to hold wrongdoers to account even when the wrongs occur outside our 
polity.  
 One could object that my view is only a clarification of Duff’s, not an alternative. If political 
consensus is driven by moral egregiousness, then my view is functionally equivalent to Duff’s.29 
It has the virtue of explaining in greater detail how the system works, but the outcome is the 
same. In other words, I have proposed that the relevant community is not merely humanity, but 
the collection of (reasonable) states. I argued that international public wrongs should not be 
identified with the morally egregious, or with atrocities, but rather with conduct that is seen, by 
consensus, to be beyond the bounds of what any reasonable state can accept. But if that boundary 
is defined by consensus on what is morally egregious, then what I have done is provide a more 
nuanced explanation of how Duff’s view works rather than providing a genuine alternative. 
The key to seeing how my view is an alternative is to recognize that it is not always the case 
that the more egregious the moral wrong, the more claim it has to be declared a public wrong. 
Consider the controversy over whether certain forms of blasphemy and defamation of religion 
                                                          
29
 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this worry. 
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should be proper concerns of international criminal law. Such proposals have gained almost no 
traction in the west, but we need not explain that in terms of a disagreement over egregiousness. 
One can believe, for comprehensive reasons, that blasphemy is a moral wrong as egregious as 
any other, without being committed to the conclusion that that it is the proper business of the 
criminal law. (Even if one thinks this conduct should be criminalized domestically, there is no 
need to conclude it is an international public wrong.) What makes something an international 
public wrong is not its egregiousness, but consensus on the bounds of reasonable self-defining 
values of the world’s polities. If some conduct is a direct violation of any reasonable set of self-
defining values, it is an international public wrong. In this particular case, there is no consensus 
that a reasonable set of self-defining values must consider these religious offenses to be public 
wrongs. This third option, therefore, makes humanity more important to the domestic law, and 
particular polities more important to the international law, than Duff allows. 
This approach also gives us a more nuanced understanding of in whose name courts act. Duff 
claims that if we appeal to the moral community in the domestic case, this means that local 
courts ultimately act in name of justice, not merely of their local community. Demands of justice 
are understood in cosmopolitan terms: they are not grounded in any particular community nor 
addressed only to its members. He argues that approach “can succeed only if we can plausibly 
explain the distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ wrongs without appealing to ideas of 
community: but I do not think that we can do so. What is ‘private’ in this context is what I can 
claim to be my, or our, business but not yours; what is ‘public’ is what I must admit to be your 
business as well as mine or ours”.30 To identify something as a public wrong always requires 
identifying the relevant public to whom the wrongdoer is answerable. However, my proposal 
does not merely appeal to an impersonal demand of justice that that the wrongdoer be punished 
                                                          
30
 Duff, supra note 2., p. 596. 
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because the universal requirement to hold people responsible should be satisfied in a personal, 
local way. The ideal is for domestic courts to speak both in the name of justice and in the name 
of a local community. We can both appeal to the moral community and to the self-defining 
values of our particular polity. Some public wrongs we see as relevant to the entire moral 
community because any reasonable set of self-defining values must be opposed to those wrongs. 
Other public wrongs are purely internal matters because not every reasonable polity must see the 
conduct as a public wrong. But within the relevant state, all of those wrongs are the proper 
concern of all citizens.  
Duff objects to the cosmopolitan approach to the domestic criminal law because without 
appeal to a particular community we will have no way to distinguish private from public wrongs. 
However, when it comes to international public wrongs, Duff’s view seems to be the one that is 
unable to explain the distinction between private and public wrongs. If the relevant community is 
simply the moral community, which is not a political community and therefore lacks self-
defining values, how do we specify the wrongs? Moral egregiousness is not a satisfactory answer 
because it would mean that no egregious wrongs could be private. If you think blasphemy is an 
egregious wrong, you must think it is a public wrong. Conversely, the egregiousness of 
blasphemy must be mitigated if you do not think it is a public wrong. If we take that line, the 
distinction between public and non-public wrongs disappears. The only distinction remaining is 
between moral wrongs seen as egregious enough to warrant criminalization and wrongs seen as 
less weighty. 
The answer is that the global community comes to a general consensus on what must be 
incompatible with any reasonable set of self-defining values. The international case relies upon 
the domestic case. Duff was correct in his claim that the domestic criminal law is the paradigm 
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case. But the domestic case has more to do with the moral community than he claims, and the 
international case has more to do with particular polities than he claims. What defines 
international public wrongs is that any reasonable political community must take them as 
violations of their defining values. If a state does not, either because its defining values are 
beyond the bounds of the reasonable, or because the state has simply failed, then those wrongs 
are everyone’s proper business. Everyone deserves the universal human good of living in a polity 
that affirms and enforces a reasonable set of self-defining values. When a particular state breaks 
down and fails to do this, then for us to show good will towards its residents, we need some 
international legal system to hold its wrongdoers to account.  
One might object that this approach is far too inclusive. It makes many wrongs that are 
handled domestically, and according to Duff ought to be so handled, a proper international 
matter of concern. Murder is incompatible with any reasonable set of self-defining values, so is it 
no longer the proper business of domestic courts? Duff’s theory gave an explanation of why 
murder in one nation is properly tried in that nation. It seems that according to my view, only 
wrongs on which nations reasonably disagree are appropriate objects of domestic prosecution. 
Or, at least, those are the only wrongs that are not potentially the proper concern of international 
criminal law. 
There is simply an overdetermination of reasons to hold the alleged perpetrator to account. 
The domestic criminal law acts in the name of both universal justice and the local community. 
The reason why most crimes should be handled domestically, and why it is proper for dictators 
who commit atrocities to be tried locally whenever possible, is that it reinforces the polity’s self-
defining values. It is no problem to point out that certain public wrongs are such that prosecuting 
them would reinforce any reasonable set of self-defining values. This leads to disagreement with 
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Duff over the nature of both international and domestic public wrongs. Duff says of international 
public wrongs that “perpetrators must answer not just to their local communities, but to 
humanity”.31 I would change the last claim to state that they are potentially answerable to 
humanity, but only when no particular state adequately holds them responsible. This is far from a 
merely efficiency-based justification for local attachments. As for domestic public wrongs, Duff 
argues that crimes such as rape and murder are only our proper concern when they happen in our 
polity. To the contrary, they are our proper concern everywhere. However, we respect the 
Territoriality Principle and the Principle of Complementarity (which states that we only try cases 
not adequately handled by a relevant state’s legal system) not merely because this is efficient, but 
because there is real value in these wrongdoers being brought to account by their own polities. 
What is ideal is that all crimes (other than truly international crimes of aggression) be tried 
locally. Doing so provides an opportunity for fellow citizens to affirm their self-defining values. 
Duff is correct that a rape committed in Poland is not the proper business of the English. 
However, that is not because the wrongdoer can only be authoritatively tried by his co-citizens, 
but because Poland has a criminal justice system that treats rape as a public wrong. That is 
sufficient to respect their sovereignty, and their sovereign control over the crime is ideal because 
it reinforces their self-defining values. When a wrong occurs in a state that does not see the 
wrong as incompatible with its (unreasonable) self-defining values, or in a failed state, then it is 
the proper business of everyone and every polity. Duff’s conclusion about a crime that occurs in 
Poland is only conditionally true. International public wrongs have to do with consensus on what 
must be incompatible with any reasonable set of self-defining values. The international criminal 
law ought to deal with states that are unreasonable or nonfunctioning. When we respond to such 
wrongs through the international criminal law, we respond to what was already our proper 
                                                          
31
 Ibid., p.601. 
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concern as citizens. By responding, we avoid warranted feelings of guilt and resentment over 
failing to hold the perpetrator to account and failing to secure the victim’s (and perpetrator’s) 
human right to live under a political community whose self-defining values meet a minimum 
standard of reasonableness.  
Both Duff’s account and my alternative appeal to values in order to determine what counts as 
a public wrong. The reason why morally egregious acts and atrocities drive Duff’s view is that 
those things fundamentally conflict with the values he thinks matter to international law. I have 
argued that the relevant values should not be identified with our comprehensive moral and 
philosophical doctrines. Rather, we should remember that there need not be any simple 
relationship between what someone finds morally egregious and what they consider to be a 
public harm. Public harms are only a subset of the morally egregious. Public harms should be 
understood in terms of acts that violate the self-defining values of any reasonable polity, 
regardless of what comprehensive philosophical or religious views happen to be dominant within 
any given polity. Rawls’ notion of the reasonable in a domestic context is useful. He understands 
reasonableness in terms of persons being willing to propose and abide by fair terms of social 
cooperation, and to justify their arguments in favor of certain sorts of state policies in thin, 
political terms that they believe their fellow citizens could accept, regardless of whatever 
comprehensive doctrines those citizens may hold. Applying that idea in an international context, 
I should not offer an argument that some particular conduct is an international public wrong 
when I can only expect you to agree if you share my comprehensive religious or philosophical 
conception of the good or are willing to convert to it. We should rather appeal to public values 
that can matter to all of humanity. Candidate values for filling out my view include reciprocity, 
respect, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, and autonomy. More work needs to be done to 
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articulate this notion of reasonableness and to identify the relevant values. This paper has 
outlined the structure that such a view should take. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This modification of Duff’s view allows us to appeal to the moral community in both the 
domestic and international criminal law without losing the value of particular, local attachments. 
My alternative fills out Duff’s analysis and provides guidance on how to define international 
public wrongs. He implicitly relies on the notions of moral egregiousness and atrocities, but they 
are at best imperfect proxies for what makes something an international public wrong. Consensus 
on the boundaries of reasonable self-defining values for polities determines the set of 
international public wrongs. My proposal takes what is so powerful in his domestic analysis and 
repurposes it to answer these international questions. 
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